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I. THE REVIVAL OF STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM
Cosmopolitanism is a compulsory re-education programme in openness to the world.1
In recent intellectual debates, the emergence of the modern cosmopolitan
worldview has often been traced back to the period beginning with the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, which established the European nation-state system and its
principles of territorial sovereignty and tolerance for religious beliefs. The
confirmation and disintegration of this worldview is said to have been
commemorated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which
was built into the United Nations Charter with a pledge to protect fundamental
freedoms and promote personal dignity independently of and ultimately beyond
the borders of the nation-state. These historical parameters—1648–1948—are
taken to mark the moment when citizenship rights guaranteed by state sovereignty
were superseded or at least complemented by the liberal principle of respect for
personal autonomy beyond collective self-determination; in effect, they anticipate
the affirmation of the rights of people in contrast to the enforcement of the laws of
nations.2 Overlapping with or even exceeding these temporal (and textual)
* Sociology, University of British Columbia. Among the many challenging critiques of the earlier
version of this Article presented at the “Law As . . .” II symposium at the University of California,
Irvine School of Law, I would especially like to acknowledge the stimulating comments by Aziz Rana,
Michelle McKinley, Constantin Fasolt, Kunal Parker, and Renisa Mawani. I am also grateful to
Michael Rosenberg and David Howes for their helpful remarks on the draft I presented at a
colloquium at Concordia University; to Mo Ismailzai for refiguring my diagrams; to Agnes
MacDonald for her insights into Mannheim; and to Sylvia Berryman, who has been tutoring me over
the past three summers in a kind of itinerant and “practical kynicism” as we teach our respective
undergraduate courses on Global Citizenship while traveling through Guatemala.
1. ULRICH BECK, COSMOPOLITAN VISION 102 (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity Press 2006)
(2004).
2. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, AFTER LIBERALISM 145–61 (1995).
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indicators of the modern political imagination are the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 on the one hand, which juxtaposed the natural
rights of all humans with the national rights of citizens to liberty, equality, and
solidarity, and the popular challenges of 1989 from Berlin to Beijing on the other,
which demanded the realization of these rights through the breakup of the
Socialist-Communist bloc and its territorial state-system.3 From the perspective of
these apparently complementary frames of reference—defined by the geocultural
axes of east/west and north/south, and along the historico-political timeline of
the rise and fall of the modern world system—“cosmopolitanism” seems to be a
relatively recent worldview and a primarily occidental project for recognizing
common human aspirations, over and against the all-too-human tendency to see
the larger world from the restricted standpoint of local prejudices and parochial
preoccupations. In Ulrich Beck’s influential formulation, the cosmopolitan
perspective “contradicts and replaces” provincial prejudices, but at the same time
it also “entails and extends” the nationalist worldview, with cosmopolitanism
encompassing and reinterpreting nationalist parochialism by revealing its blindness
or shortsightedness.4 To resolve this dilemma, we need to recognize the
complementarity and indispensability of both particular and universal “visions”
from the perspective of their ultimate and inevitable purpose: “cosmopolitanism
without provincialism is empty, provincialism without cosmopolitanism is blind.”5
Although I cannot fully develop the point here, I want to consider what
might be gained by expanding the debate over cosmopolitanism beyond
conventional references to the historico-political and geocultural framework of the
occidental nation-state and its “European experimental protocol.” 6 Is it possible
to radicalize this culturally specific inheritance by imagining its nonmodern roots
in a scientific-cosmic conception of the warring factions and peaceful settlements
between subhuman entities and superhuman powers? 7 And can we extend the
conventional notion of a cultural and moral cosmopolitanism, which fosters
universal concern and respect for legitimate differences between humans, to
include a legal and scientific “cosmopolitics,” which acknowledges local rights and
extends obligations grounded in attachments between human and nonhuman
agents alike? In a controversial statement that inaugurated the cosmopolitanism
debates of the last few decades, Martha Nussbaum implicitly both invokes and

3. See NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 12–14 (2009).
4. Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity, 51 BRIT. J.
SOC. 79, 90, 92 (2000).
5. BECK, supra note 1, at 7; cf. IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
Purpose, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 41, 41–53 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1970) (1784).
6. BECK, supra note 1, at 176.
7. ISABELLE STENGERS, COSMOPOLITICS I, at 26–27, 61 (Robert Bononno trans., Univ. of
Minn. Press 2010) (1997);.Bruno Latour, Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics?: Comments on the Peace Terms
of Ulrich Beck, 10 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 450, 450–62 (2004).

2014]

REFIGURING LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM

275

sets aside these questions while adopting and revising the Stoic model for
expanding parochial worldviews and developing personal capacities within a global
or universal framework:
The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to
give up local identifications, which can be a source of great richness in
life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local
affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first
one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then follows
the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local groups, fellow citydwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list of
groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or
sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a
whole. Our task as citizens of the world will be to “draw the circles
somehow toward the center” (Stoic philosopher Hierocles, 1st–2nd CE)
making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on.8
As the reference to group affiliations and personal identities suggests, Nussbaum
places more stress on the political than on the cosmic aspect of cosmopolitanism.
As critics have noted, the problem with this Stoic figure of concentric circles of
civic identifications lies in the implied need for an imperial center of control, in
which a powerful city-state radiates political power and cultural influence
centrifugally outward while maintaining its boundaries through military and social
enforcement against centripetal countercurrents directed inward (see fig. 1). In this
conception, “cosmopolitanism” can plausibly be construed as an expression of
American patriotism, for instance, understood not as a form of ethnocentric
particularism or racist coercion, but rather as liberal tolerance in defense of
national and personal autonomy, or even as “a compulsory re-education
programme in openness to the world” applied to illiberal, aggressive, intolerant, or
simply ignorant regimes abroad, as in Beck’s telling formulation.9
Figure 1: Stoic Cosmopolitanism

8. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY? 3, 9
(Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
9. BECK, supra note 1, at 102; see, e.g., Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022,
1060–71 (2007).
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As others have argued, from a legal point of view, the cosmopolitan vision
does not necessarily contradict, but may rather be the condition for a form of
“constitutional patriotism.”10 That is, cosmopolitan principles may entail, rather
than eliminate, the localized expression of loyalty to legally enforced rights and the
commitment to procedural norms grounded in a political culture of democratic
institution building and decision making.11 A vision of expanding concentric
circles is simultaneously the product and the presupposition of a public sphere
“that includes within it both a dimension of rational-critical discourse and a
dimension of social imagination and promising.” 12 Even in this admirably liberal
formulation, however, a well-meaning and legitimate universal aspiration to justice
and equality could potentially endanger otherwise benign or emancipatory ways of
being and thinking, ideologically promoting particular and powerful local ways of
seeing, knowing, and acting while suppressing others, as Marx and Engels had
already argued in The Communist Manifesto: “The bourgeoisie has through its
exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production
and consumption in every country. . . . In place of the old local and national
seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal
interdependence of nations.” 13 Today, we might add that, insofar as even “the
intellectual creations of individual nations have become common property,” 14 a
“cosmo-theory” or global worldview that professes to speak beyond local interests
in the name of universal ideals and a global social imagination cannot remain aloof
from the privileges of class inequalities and status hierarchies.
A further question I want to consider is whether this concentric model of
cosmopolitanism is either too narrow or too static to account for a world system
in which shifting local and uprooted cosmic affiliations encompass collectivities of
human and nonhuman agents governed by the naturally occurring as well as
socially enacted laws of cosmos and polis alike. To approach these issues, I turn to
some classical theorists in the sociology of knowledge and culture who argue that
ideas, beliefs, and values of all kinds—including those that inform laws ordering
human and natural affairs—never exist in the realm of pure mind or in the brain
of a disinterested thinker free of particular ties and material demands. Rather,
nature and society are constituted by multiple yet finite provinces of meaning—
law and science, for instance—each with their own distinctive cognitive styles,
accents of reality, objects of concern, and principles of transcendence and
immanence, and all of which are inhabited by citizens or denizens of several

10. Craig Calhoun, Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public
Sphere, 14 PUB. CULTURE 147, 149 (2002).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 170.
13. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX: SELECTED
WRITINGS 219, 224 (David McLellan ed., 1977).
14. Id.
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worlds at the same time.15 Neither in law nor in science can there be an
unattached thought or thing that is completely solitary and free; rather, subjects
and objects exist within actor-networks, which are collectives of organisms and
machines that can be seen to be relatively “displaced and vacillating” or
“distributed yet centered” with respect to others inhabiting the same or adjacent
fields, depending on the “angle” in which they are viewed and experienced.16
Following the lessons of some classic texts in the sociology of knowledge, both
ancient and modern, I propose to examine a few cases or exempla not as valueideals for us to emulate, but rather as types or models illuminating some of the
impasses and implications of the recent revival of cosmopolitanism. The
significance of this exercise lies in acknowledging how the irreducibly particular
character of legal knowledge, which can be seen in the difficulty of translating laws
between jurisdictions, for example, does not negate but may even provide a
necessary condition for its universalist aspirations, as we can see when we recover
the specific circumstances under which human rights or even natural laws are
formulated or discovered.
To begin complicating the legal issues implied by the Stoic model invoked in
general terms above, I take the situation of “the stranger” as a cultural figure or
social type that is both familiar and foreign, close yet distant, rooted as well as
homeless, and simultaneously inside and outside networks of intersecting social
circles.17 The legal-cultural manifestations of the modern stranger confront us with
the experiences of the exile, the immigrant, and the refugee on one end of the
social scale, and with the tourist, the human rights officer, and the cosmopolitan
intellectual on the other.18 Georg Simmel traces the metropolitan and modern
sources of the legal status of the new cosmopolitan resident of the medieval
commercial town, who lives by the principle that Stadtluft macht frei (city air makes
one free), and so experiences the expansion of spatial and temporal horizons
beyond the physical and personal boundaries of the self, tribe, or village:
Just as in feudal times the “free” man was he who stood under the law of
the land, that is, under the law of the largest social unit, but he was unfree
who derived his legal rights only from the narrow circle of a feudal
community—so today in an intellectualized and refined sense the citizen
of the metropolis is “free” in contrast with the trivialities and prejudices
which bind the small town person. . . . It is not only the immediate size of
the area and population which, on the basis of the world-historical

15. ALFRED SCHUTZ, Transcendences and Multiple Realities, in ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND
SOCIAL RELATIONS 245, 253–56 (Helmut R. Wagner ed., 1970).
16. See HÉLÈNE MIALET, HAWKING INCORPORATED: STEPHEN HAWKING AND THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE KNOWING SUBJECT 192–94, 197 (2012).
17. 2 GEORG SIMMEL, SOCIOLOGY: INQUIRIES INTO THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
FORMS 601, 604–05 (Anthony J. Blasi et al. eds. & trans., Brill 2009) (1908).
18. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF
STRANGERS 89–92, 94–99 (2006); Michelle A. McKinley, Conviviality, Cosmopolitan Citizenship, and
Hospitality, 5 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 55, 76–77, 80–83 (2009).
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correlation between the increase in the size of the social unit and the
degree of personal inner and outer freedom, makes the metropolis the
locus of this condition. It is rather in transcending this purely tangible
extensiveness that the metropolis also becomes the seat of
cosmopolitanism.19
In what follows, I want to elaborate on Simmel’s image of the metropolitan
type as both a member of a globalizing society of strangers and as the local seat of
cosmopolitan intellectuality. As Tim Brennan20 notes with reference to this passage,
“cosmo-theory” can be described as an attempt to grapple with the paradox that a
cosmopolitan outlook is necessarily local even as it disavows its local appeal,
particularly when a diasporic intelligentsia tries to export its own
“psychogeography of modernity” through expanding linkages of cultural and
economic capital (a point I return to in the conclusion). Rather than attempting to
map the many paths that have led to the revival of cosmopolitan discourse since
1945, I focus on the work of exiled intellectuals from the interwar period in the
generation after Simmel, especially Karl Mannheim and his student Norbert Elias,
whose arguments can be understood to anticipate the regime of international law,
human rights, and cosmopolitan ethics of the postwar era. The “homeless”
position of the intellectual in the grips of the crisis of the nation-state, I argue, can
help us to locate legal knowledge within an increasingly cosmopolitan worldview.
II. LIBERAL COSMOPOLITANISM BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
This unanchored, relatively classless stratum is, to use Alfred Weber’s terminology,
the “socially unattached intelligentsia” (freischwebende Intelligenz). . . .
Participation in a common educational heritage progressively tends to suppress
differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual educated
people on the basis of the education they have received.21
The cosmopolitan worldview espoused in various ways by intellectuals today
is largely the expression of a particular form of liberalism, typically situated as a
kind of alternative middle path, vital center, or “third way” struggling to assert
democratic values of freedom and equality between the older extremes of
conservatism (including its “bureaucratic,” “romantic,” and “fascist” variants) and
communism (and other forms of radicalism, including “anarchism” and
“socialism”). Karl Mannheim’s German-language writings from the Weimar
period (he had immigrated from Hungary to study in Heidelberg), culminating in
his masterwork Ideology and Utopia (the English translation of 1936 is an expanded
version of the 1929 edition), stress that despite their political and intellectual
differences, conservatives, liberals, and communists tend to agree that history is

19. GEORG SIMMEL, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL
FORMS: SELECTED WRITINGS 324, 334 (Donald N. Levine ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1903).
20. Timothy Brennan, Cosmo-Theory, 100 S. ATLANTIC Q. 659, 660, 674 (2001).
21. KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY
OF KNOWLEDGE 155 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1936) (1929).
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composed of intelligible interrelations, and that an understanding of these
connections can provide “a measuring-rod for conduct.” 22 Broadly speaking, all
three practical-intellectual positions can be located within the contrast that
Mannheim draws between ideology—the thought-form that present reality
invalidates as outdated—and utopia—the thought-form that present reality
invalidates as being premature. Where ideology expresses a consciousness of the
emergence of things as they are, if only partially and after the fact, utopia
expresses a state of mind that is incongruous with existence, if only with the aim
of shattering the status quo as a way of preparing for some future order of things.
The two conflicting tendencies of the modern world can be described as an
attitude that is relatively complacent with the sociogenesis of existence and one
that aspires to transcend reality through the psychogenesis of thought, but without
losing touch with the present reality.23 Ironically, the general or total concepts of
ideology and utopia—as opposed to their critical, partial, and distorted variants—
can themselves be traced to a particular thought-form and practical orientation,
namely communism (rather than liberalism or conservatism) as expressed by Marx
and Engels in The German Ideology: “Consciousness [das Bewusstsein] can never be
anything else than conscious existence [das bewusste Sein], and the existence of men
is their actual life-process.” 24 Notwithstanding this genealogy of the modern
Weltanschauung, Mannheim argues that only the liberalism of certain progressive
intellectuals (such as those of his elite Heidelberg circle) can offer the best hope
for surmounting the antinomies of authoritarian conservatism and communism.
As he notes in his lyrical “Heidelberg Letters” (written in Hungarian), the history
of the soul and culture of this new cosmopolitan outlook entails “only reporting
the adventures of a few trailblazers and we act as if we and these few select
persons were the axis of the world.”25
Almost exactly halfway into Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim introduces his
famous figure for this quintessentially modern form of “conscious-being”: “the
socially unattached,” or (as it is often cited) free-floating intelligentsia (freischwebende
Intelligenz), a phrase that I will also translate as “oscillating intelligence” in order to
highlight Mannheim’s stress on the general, dynamic, and relational character of
this concept. “Intelligenz” here is understood both in the general sense of
“intelligence” as a capacity for reason, abstraction, and mental acuteness, and in
the specific meaning of “intelligentsia” as a particular stratum of thinkers,
speakers, readers, and writers, whether professionals or amateurs, organic or elite,
rebels or functionaries, who enjoy varying degrees of autonomy or dependence on
national cultures and local traditions. At one extreme, Intelligenz may be disciplined

22. Id. at 136.
23. Id. at 261.
24. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 13, at 159, 164.
25. KARL MANNHEIM, SOCIOLOGY AS POLITICAL EDUCATION 81 (David Kettler & Colin
Loader eds., Transaction Publishers 2001) (1930).
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and pressed into the service of gathering information for the strategic purposes of
combat, defense, and surveillance (the military meaning of “intelligence” in
English); at the other extreme, the task of a free and enlightened intellectual
stratum—from its beginnings as a bourgeois pursuit to its democratization among
the working classes, subordinate ethnic groups, women, and youth—is “to change
the world through rational means and to transform ourselves into self-conscious
human actors.” 26 At each end of the spectrum, forms of thought—from the
scientific to the commonsense—will have a vitality and intellectuality of their own
that is never entirely pure or fixed: “The life of mind is a constant flux, oscillating
between the theoretical and a-theoretical pole, involving a constant intermingling
and re-arranging of the most disparate categories of many different origins.” 27
And yet, “[i]t is precisely in times of crisis that we need the undogmatic fluidity of
intellectuals who relativize everything and are capable of understanding others.” 28
Mannheim’s vision of freischwebende Intelligenz—a relatively classless intelligentsia and
a partially oscillating intelligence suspended over the conflicts and commitments of
the age, though never entirely released from them—thus combines the
cosmopolitan humanism of sixteenth-century European thought with the
scientific rationalism of the seventeenth century, in the tradition of what Stephen
Toulmin has called “the hidden agenda of modernity.” 29
Most commentators on Mannheim’s image of the “freischwebende Intelligenz”
assume that it refers simply to a kind of formless drifting or aimless hovering of
thought in a void, completely without ties to material existence and without
perspective on reality, despite Mannheim’s insistence that it is not “suspended into
a vacuum into which social interests do not penetrate.”30 Resituated within the
context of his larger argument, this figure suggests an alternating vacillation or
wavering between extremes from a relatively fixed point suspended between them, and thus
something hanging from a grounded position located at a particular moment in time
and space. As Mannheim stresses throughout Ideology and Utopia, what
distinguishes this unresolved, or “hovering,” mode of thinking is not its complete
detachment from existence, but rather its potential for transcending particularist
or partial perspectives while nevertheless remaining bound to them. In his words,
the cardinal rule of the sociology of knowledge is to acknowledge the situational
or “existential determination of knowledge” (Seinsverbundenheit des Wissens), which is
itself relative to and bounded by “the concrete standpoint of the thinker”
(Standartsgebundenheit des Denkers).31 In figure 2, I have attempted to depict this
26.
Karl Mannheim, The Sociology of Intellectuals, 10 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 69, 69–80
(1993).
27. KARL MANNHEIM, On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung, in FROM KARL MANNHEIM
136, 143 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d expanded ed. 1993) (1923).
28. Id. at 80.
29. STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY 117–29
(1990).
30. MANNHEIM, supra note 21, at 157.
31. Id. at 78–79, 267.
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“oscillating intelligence” or “vacillating intelligentsia” as a kind of pendulum-swing
that entails such objective and intersubjective shifts in perspective. Here I present
the intersecting value-spheres, cultural domains, or social circles of liberalism,
conservatism, and communism as figurations of involvement and detachment (to
use a phrase from Norbert Elias, discussed in the next section). Each swing or
standpoint articulates theory connected to action, just as practical fields become
the “clarifying medium” through which theory is tested, altered, and developed
through time.32 A thought style, worldview, or mindset is more or less bound up
with the macrostructures of states and markets, for instance, even as it is
embodied in the particular micromilieus, experiential domains, and thoughtworlds of citizens, clients, producers, and consumers. Like Galileo’s pendulum,
which was designed as a cosmological model for measuring space-time from a
fixed point while linking the infinity of the heavens to a finite earthly domain,33
Mannheim’s pendulum sutures thought to the social world by demonstrating the
contradiction and complementarity between the little worlds of everyday
experience and the extended structures of institutionally organized thought and
existence.
Figure 2: Liberal Cosmopolitanism (Mannheim’s Pendulum)

32.
33.

Id. at 133.
See DUŠAN BJELIĆ, GALILEO’S PENDULUM: SCIENCE, SEXUALITY, AND THE BODYINSTRUMENT LINK 116–17, 123 (2003).
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In Mannheim’s terms, critical thinking and transformative action take shape
through what he calls “scientific politics,” that is, within the alternation between
the conscious reflection (“theory”) and public engagement (“practice”) of situated
agents and thinkers. Scientific politics in the modern world requires a kind of
methodical organon or intellectual instrument for “put[ting] the world at a
distance,” and thus for separating existence from thought so that “[a]n altogether
peculiar relationship comes into being.” 34 The purpose of such a device is to
discover networks and trace attachments between agents by focusing on the tense
and dynamic interplay between reality-complacent and reality-transcendent modes
of thought. Figuratively speaking, this movement can be expressed as the swaying
back-and-forth between ideology and utopia in which no position remains forever
fixed at the extremes and no idea or deed becomes stagnant through the passage
of time and flow of history:
[W]hereas the decline of ideology represents a crisis only for certain
strata, and the objectivity which comes from the unmasking of ideologies
always takes the form of self-clarification for society as a whole, the
complete disappearance of the utopian element from human thought and
action would mean that human nature and human development would
take on a totally new character . . . a static state of affairs in which man
himself becomes no more than a thing.35
Today we might say that the liberal intelligentsia and its generalized cultural
medium sustain an interest in disinterestedness and a value for value-freedom, but ideally
from a particular cultural and social location that privileges ethical self-cultivation
and openness to the world over narrow economic necessity or inexorable political
expediency. As Pierre Bourdieu argues after Mannheim, the collective mission of
the intelligentsia and the critical function of its enlightened intelligence are
measured by its distance from practical engagement, even as it is ultimately driven
by political commitments for establishing institutional forms of access to universal
values and for ensuring the production of rational thought.36
With the demise of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Third Reich,
Mannheim came to place more stress on the view that the cosmopolitan ethos of
modernity should not remain the specialist preserve of an elite intelligentsia, but
that the institutionalization of its reflexive and critical intelligence should be
guided by a practical plan for the implementation of these ideals. His other great
work, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, written in the years after his exile to
London in 1933 and published in German in 1935, followed by an expanded
English edition in 1940, assumes a didactic and instructional tone that commands
political participation, education, and mobilization, in contrast to the
contemplative style of his earlier work, which was marked by “the dramatic
34. MANNHEIM, supra note 25, at 21.
35. MANNHEIM, supra note 21, at 262–63.
36. Pierre Bourdieu, Fourth Lecture. Universal Corporatism: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern
World, 12 POETICS TODAY 655, 660–62 (1991).
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imagery and essayistic subtlety of a thinking formulated on dialectical antitheses
and paradoxical reversals.” 37 As Bryan S. Green38 notes, the concrete imaging of
abstract ideas characteristic of Mannheim’s writings from the Weimar period, such
as the pendulum-swing of ideology and utopia that I have depicted above, invites
readers to make their own connections between intellectual discourse and
everyday speech, and between political theory and social practice. This subtle style
and open mode of address of the earlier period gives way in the later work to a
more impersonal and objective posture of mastery, urgency, and mindful
adjustment to shifting demands. Rather than sketching out the dynamic relation
between existence and thought, or proposing a loosely formulated sociology of
intellect or culture (Geist) and “conscious existence” (bewusste Sein), Mannheim
now offers a systematic typology of intellectuals and a standard of rationality
methodically marked off by a sliding scale between local ties and cosmic freedoms:
The influence of the mobile type saves from intellectual provincialism
those indigenous types whom property, sentimental attachment to the
native soil, and the consciousness of a secure future have rendered not
only more stable, but also more comfortable and satisfied. At the same
time, the latter type forces the more abstract and over-mobile elements to
take account of the concrete facts, locality and slowly growing traditions
of their immediate surroundings and to assimilate them psychologically.39
When the educated stratum of trained functionaries is no longer caught up in
tightly bound mutual relationships, in static social circles defined by class and
status, or in closed cultural spheres of economic and political interests, it can
better respond to the urgency and chaos of current crises by rationally interpreting
the interdependence of parts in light of an ever-changing whole.40 From the
perspective of macrostructural historical stages of thought—from the trial and
error of chance discovery (Finden) and the goal-setting project of foresight of
invention (Erfinden), to the reflexive mediations of planning (Planen) and its
implementation—modern intelligence can learn to train itself to comprehend the
complexities of unique events while acting against the background of general
processes. The project of “democratic planning for freedom” requires that any
conflict between the functional rationalization of organizational needs or demands
and the substantial reason of value judgments or emotions be managed through
the coordination of competing goals.
Mannheim’s thought represents both the classic form of liberal
cosmopolitanism, which champions the intellectual ideal of free personality, and

37. DAVID KETTLER & VOLKER MEJA, KARL MANNHEIM AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM
137 (1995).
38. Bryan S. Green, Karl Mannheim: A Case Study in Textual Decline, 9 J. CLASSICAL SOC. 234,
239–40 (2009).
39. KARL MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 94 (Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1940) (1935).
40. Id. at 153.
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its crisis and demise, insofar as he advocated the integration of an enlightened
critical ideal into an institutionalized complex of regulated objectives. Although his
focus is on the contemporary situation of economic crisis, world war, and political
dictatorship on the Continent, his outlook is decidedly global and even “cosmic”
while stopping short of any call for “the end of ideology,” which became the
rallying cry of later neoconservatives and neoliberals.41 In his view, the social
technique of “planning for freedom” is the most that can be salvaged from the
wreckage of laissez-faire individualism, if only through a process that may stimulate
“a new experimental attitude in social affairs, a readiness to learn from all the
lessons of history.” 42 Figuratively speaking, the most urgent task of planning in
“the age of reconstruction” entails drafting rules and laws for defining and
ordering the creation of newly organized fields out of the old “spheres,” each with
its own distinctive properties and forces:
Whenever society, instead of expanding in concentric circles, develops
new spheres of action which traverse the boundaries of the concrete
groups, we speak of a field structure. Where fresh markets must be won
after economic or political conquest overseas, where new industries
create fresh trade at home, or propaganda is needed to persuade people
to take up unfamiliar work, the predetermined patterns adopted by the
concrete groups are apt to break down. Whenever conflict and
competition are in full swing, and individuals have to make their own
adjustments, whenever it is impossible to foresee the trend of events, the
laws which govern the magnetic waves of the field structure have more effect on
human nature than established custom or rational organization.43
The kind of “interdependent thinking” called for with the emergence of a
cosmopolitan worldview and a global civil society will therefore involve the
creation of legal structures and the reinvigoration of bureaucracies in ways that
enhance the capacity of institutions to foster care and concern, but without
sacrificing the virtues of efficiency and objectivity.44 Echoing some of the
arguments of the “ordoliberals” of the Freiburg School writing around the same
time,45 Mannheim suggests a middle way between market anarchy and socialist or
fascist authoritarianism by envisioning a liberal parliamentary state that would
absorb and regulate the institutions of civil society while adapting to the
fluctuating orders of the free market and free enterprise, thereby pacifying class
war though perhaps only postponing world war. The history of parliamentarism,

41. H.T. WILSON, Functional Rationality and ‘Sense of Function’: Critical Comments on an Ideological
Distortion, in THE VOCATION OF REASON: STUDIES IN CRITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
THE AGE OF MAX WEBER 111, 133–37 (Thomas M. Kemple ed., 2004).
42. See MANNHEIM, supra note 39, at 365.
43. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., id. at 229–36.
45. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE
FRANCE, 1978–1979, at 176–79 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave MacMillan
2008) (1978–1979).
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he argues, can be characterized as “the control of controls,” especially over the
legal and economic frameworks that govern social relations.46 Realizing such a
project may require not just the passion to plan characteristic of the trained
functionary, but also the cultivated enlightenment of the intellectual courtier and
the civil manners of the educated citizen.
III. THE CIVIL MANNERS OF LIBERAL COSMOPOLITANISM
The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself who
ultimately exists quite independently of the great world outside, determines the image
of human beings in general. Every other human being is likewise seen as a homo
clausus; his core, his being, his true self appears likewise as something divided
within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, including every other human
being.47
Although Mannheim did not live to see the Nuremburg Trials, the
subsequent establishment of the United Nations, or the ratification of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the sociology of liberal intelligence that
he sketched in the 1920s and the social techniques of democratic planning that he
outlined in the 1930s arguably anticipate and frame the renewal of “legal
cosmopolitanism” in the decades to come. Following Mannheim, I argue that the
cosmopolitan consciousness does not simply hover freely in the heavenly ideals of
universalism and disinterestedness without some practical tie and political
grounding in particular times and places. To ensure that this point does not itself
get lost in decontextualized abstractions, I want to consider briefly how one such
exemplary moment can be seen in the clash between Mannheim and his mentor,
Alfred Weber, at the German Sociological Society Meetings in Zurich in
September 1928 and at their joint seminars in February 1929.48 For my purposes,
these scenes are significant first because Mannheim credits Weber with the notion
of “freischwebende Intelligenz” (in the passage from Ideology of Utopia referred to above,
but for which Mannheim offers no citation), and second because the dispute
between them is both a comment on and an enactment of their contrasting
intellectual views regarding the standpoint of the intellectual and the social
foundations of intelligence. Ironically, each assumes a position within a cultural
field defined by intellectual competition and generational conflict (Mannheim’s
preoccupations during this period, and the topic of his Zurich talk), while
questioning whether universal ideas and “ultimate attitudes” can exist
independently of class interests, socioeconomic locations, and political views

46. MANNHEIM, supra note 39, at 330.
47. NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS 472 (Eric Dunning et al. eds., Edmond
Jephcott trans., Blackwell Publishers 1994) (1939).
48. KARL MANNHEIM, Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon, in ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE 191, 191–229 (Paul Kecskemeti ed. & trans., 1952) [hereinafter MANNHEIM,
Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon]; KARL MANNHEIM, The Intellectualism Dispute, in SOCIOLOGY AS
POLITICAL EDUCATION, supra note 25, at 109, 109–29.
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(Weber’s primary question, and the substance of his responses on both occasions).
Each starts out by addressing the problem that Georg Lukács had posed in his
History and Class Consciousness of how knowledge is bounded by material
processes,49 a thesis already posed by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology and
The Communist Manifesto: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling
ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time
its ruling intellectual force.” 50 In reply to Mannheim’s argument that civilized ideals
and cultured values cannot attain anything more than relative autonomy from
material social forces, Weber accuses Mannheim of falsely assuming that the
intellectual commitment to “value-freedom” (Wertfreiheit) necessarily entails a
radically liberal stance of ethical neutrality, cultural relativism, or methodological
perpectivalism, rather than a genuine commitment to universal ideas or
transhistorical truth. For both Weber and Mannheim the question is not whether
but in what ways and to what degree the liberal-cosmopolitan ideal of “freischwebende
Intelligenz” can be realized for all practical purposes. Viewed as an exemplary
moment in the cultural politics and intellectual struggles of the Weimar era, the
intense dispute between these men is symptomatic of how “matter-of-factness”
(Sachlichkeit) itself becomes an element within the increasingly pervasive personal
and social style of the era, as well as a weapon within a polemical battle for
mobilizing the minds of the coming generation.51
In a curious way, Norbert Elias—Mannheim’s younger colleague and
research assistant at the time, who in later years recalled his reaction to this public
confrontation between his two mentors—frames each position as a sociological
and intellectual event in the history of thought with enormous personal
significance for each of them, and as a crucial turning point in his own thinking.
As Elias remembers it, the dispute between his former Habilitation supervisor
(Weber) and current research supervisor (Mannheim) at the Zurich meetings had
the effect of repeating timeworn conceptual dualisms between consciousness and
existence, which both thinkers otherwise attempted to overcome even as they
violated the codes of civilized propriety governing scholarly debate.52 Mannheim’s
lecture in Zurich treats “competition” not just in the traditional way as a technical
problem within the economic sphere, but also more broadly as a cultural
49. GEORG LUKÁCS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 2–5, 189 (Rodney Livingstone
trans., Merlin Press 1971) (1922); MANNHEIM, supra note 25, at 110–12.
50. Marx & Engels, supra note 24, at 176 (emphasis added); Marx & Engels, supra note 13, at
236.
51. Cf. Andreas Huyssen, Foreword to PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON,
at ix (Michael Eldred trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1987) (1983) (discussing the “new objectivity” as a
weapon in the generational battle between intellectuals of the interwar period).
52. See generally NORBERT ELIAS, REFLECTIONS ON A LIFE (Edmund Jephcott trans., Polity
Press 1994) (1987) [hereinafter ELIAS, REFLECTIONS ON A LIFE]; NORBERT ELIAS, Contribution to the
Debate on Karl Mannheim: The Importance of Competition in the Intellectual Field, in EARLY WRITINGS 67, 68–
70 (Edmund Jephcott trans., Univ. Coll. Dublin Press 2006) (1929) [hereinafter ELIAS, EARLY
WRITINGS]; Richard Kilminster, Norbert Elias and Karl Mannheim: Closeness and Distance, 10 THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 81, 84, 93–96 (1993).

2014]

REFIGURING LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM

287

phenomenon that determines the existential struggle for truth in an intellectual
realm, and thus as a topic for the sociology of knowledge,53 an argument that had
earlier been outlined in general terms by his teacher, Georg Simmel.54 To illustrate
the point, he considers the controversy over “value-freedom” in the intellectual
field, a debate that Alfred Weber and his brother Max had been engaged in years
before, from the perspectives of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism,
understood not just as ideological or political positions, but also as styles of
thought and cultural currents (Geistesströmungen).55 The life of the mind is not just a
technique for achieving tacit consensus or quiet contemplation inasmuch as it is
defined by conflicts (Streiten) between opposing intellectual forces, leading to their
fragmentation or concentration, polarization or synthesis, and monopolization or
democratization. In Weber’s indignant reply to this argument (which, ironically, he
contradicts while confirming through his own performance), he accuses his junior
colleague of simply refining vulgar materialism and reasserts his position that
universal categories and ultimate values are not existentially bounded. Elias’s
subsequent response to both speakers—in his remarks at the time and in his
memoirs decades later56—avoids overtly taking sides in the dispute by affirming
what he calls the “revolutionary” value of disciplined observation and intellectual
objectivity, which he considers to be a necessary detour on the way toward
intelligent practical evaluation and critical engagement.
From the perspective of this pivotal debate, Elias’s classic work in the 1930s
on the rise of the court society and the dynamics of the civilizing process from the
Middle Ages to the modern era can be read as an attempt to find some middle
ground between the theoretical positions of his former mentors by exploring the
common history that produced them. Elias’s studies provide a broad framework
for examining the rise of a liberal cosmopolitan consciousness: first, by tracing its
intellectual, political, and legal manifestations as they emerge from the centrifugal
and centripetal dynamics of social regulation through state formation; and second,
by examining the intensification of self-control that emerged through the
cultivation of personal relations of tolerance, order, and propriety in the shift from
the canons of noble courtoisie to the codes of bourgeois civilité. 57 This
“psychogenetic” dimension specifies how “sociogenetic” processes can be traced
across large-scale geocultural and institutional transformations, and affords us a
useful insight into the personal relations of power and politeness at stake in the
transformation of the norms of justice and sovereignty from the royal court to the

53. See MANNHEIM, Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon, supra note 48, at 191–94.
54. See 1 GEORG SIMMEL, SOCIOLOGY: INQUIRIES INTO THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
FORMS 258–78 (Anthony J. Blasi et al. eds. & trans., Brill 2009) (1908).
55. See id. at 216–21.
56. See ELIAS, REFLECTIONS ON A LIFE, supra note 52, at 101–20; ELIAS, EARLY WRITINGS,
supra note 52, at 67–70.
57. See ELIAS, supra note 47, at 47–72.
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court of law, as in the following excerpt from Elias’s account of the transition
from medieval kingship to modern government:
[T]he meaning of etiquette for Louis XIV . . . . is not a matter of
ceremonial, but an instrument for the ruling of subjects. If power exists
but is not visible in the appearance of the ruler, the people will not
believe in it. They must see in order to believe. The more a prince
distances himself, the greater will be the respect shown to him by the
people.58
Caught between the royal ruler and his subjects was the nobility, whose shrinking
financial basis left it vulnerable to the challenge of the emerging bourgeoisie and
its growing wealth, and who in turn needed the king to protect it against the
threats and presumptions of the nobility.59 As Simmel remarked a generation
before, each stratum occupied an intermediary position in the social hierarchy, but
where “the middle class can expand upward or downward, the nobility repulses
both.”60 And where the aristocracy of the early modern period offered a
historically unique solution to the balance between the inherited interdependencies
of the social whole and the autonomous aspirations of the individual, the
bourgeoisie of the late eighteenth century adopted a more “cosmopolitan attitude”
in which the equality of a common “humanity” was combined with the freedom
of the personality and against the constraints of national solidarity and its cultural
impositions.61 Both bourgeois and noble “figurations” of individuality would then
find new and modified expression in the nineteenth century in the conception of
the individual law (das individuelle Gesetz ) that governs the expansion of the spheres
of action and existence to the extent that the social circles around the individual
open up and become both more autonomous and more interdependent. As the
grip of custom and morality loosens and the horizons of thinking and doing widen
with the expansion of the industrial metropolis, the qualitative singularity and
uniquely irreplaceable character of each human being is potentially enhanced along
with the self-legislating capacity of the individual.
In Elias’s terms, it was the sociogenesis of the modern state out of the
dynamics of feudalization that gave rise to the “power figurations” of finance, law,
and science, and that eventually found expression in flexible personal attitudes
regarding the values of rank and order within the cosmic and social scales of both
human and nonhuman nature. The pendulum-swing of the liberal attitude of
oscillating intelligence thus finds a precedent in Galileo’s astronomical
investigations of the late medieval and early modern period, which were the
concern of Elias’s later study of mechanical time and technical knowledge that
extends his account of the civilizing process to address the rise of natural science
58. NORBERT ELIAS, THE COURT SOCIETY 128 (Edmund Jephcott trans., Univ. Coll. Dublin
Press rev. ed. 2006) (1933).
59. Id. at 181.
60. 2 SIMMEL, supra note 17, at 642.
61. Id. at 648.
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and the modern cosmopolitan worldview. Insofar as Galileo’s inquiries were
facilitated by the magnifying device of the telescope and mediated by the
experimental mechanism of the pendulum, for instance, they reconfigure the
relationship between cosmos and polis, heaven and earth, by introducing a “new
common sense” with respect to the laws governing both the natural and human
worlds:
Galileo’s innovatory imagination led him to change the function of the
ancient timing device by using it systematically as a gauge for the flux not
of social but of natural events. In that way a new concept of ‘time’, that
of ‘physical time’, began to branch off from the older, relatively more
unitary human-centered concept. It was the corollary of a corresponding
change in people’s concept of nature. Increasingly, ‘nature’ assumed in
people’s eyes the character of an autonomous, mechanical nexus of
events which was purposeless, but well-ordered: it obeyed ‘laws’.62
Just as the modern judge adjudicates tensions between human beings by invoking
the formal (mechanical) and substantive (material) dimensions of law, so does
modern science try to bridge the gap between the empirical and experiential
observations of nature in an attempt to discover nature’s own laws, thereby
shattering the image of an inanimate, uniform, and unchangeable order of
existence that appears to hold everything in an irreversible double-bind.63 In this
regard, the judge and the scientist each maneuvers between the value-ideals of
charisma and casuistry, courtliness and civility, the natural and civil virtues that
Max Weber appreciated in the English tradition of justice, and that are often cited
as the hallmarks of the cosmopolitan sensibility.64 The notion of “physical time,”
which the modern age reveals through the movement of the pendulum, is then
instituted as a pattern of cosmic order and social control, and is internalized as a
technique of self-constraint regulating the individual personality.65
Elias’s attempt to deepen our understanding of the existential determination
of knowledge from its cultural-political to its natural-scientific dimension returns
us to what I am calling “Mannheim’s pendulum,” understood as a figuration for
the modulating and often mechanized intelligence of liberal cosmopolitanism
generally, and for its manifestation as legal cosmopolitanism more specifically.
Elias’s project reconfigures the standard account of the rise of a distinctively
modern scientific worldview by considering how the sociogenetic dynamic of
institution-building shapes the psychogenetic processes of self-formation—in

62. 9 NORBERT ELIAS, An Essay on Time, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF NORBERT ELIAS
31, 94 (Steven Loyal & Stephen Mennell eds., Univ. Coll. Dublin Press rev. ed. 2007) (1984).
63. 8 NORBERT ELIAS, Involvement and Detachment, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF NORBERT
ELIAS 3, 162 (Stephen Quilley ed., Univ. Coll. Dublin Press rev. ed. 2007) (1983).
64. See generally EDWARD SHILS, THE VIRTUE OF CIVILITY 63–102 (Steven Grosby ed., 1997);
2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1111–57 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of
Cal. Press 1978) (1910); Paul Sahni, Max Weber’s Sociology of Law: Judge as Mediator, 9 J. CLASSICAL SOC.
209, 209–33 (2009).
65. See 9 ELIAS, supra note 62, at 10–11.
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terms of the struggle for a pure self-consciousness, a “we-less I,” and a selfcontained individuality—as a distinctively occidental product of the civilizing
process.66 Viewed in this light as the outcome of a network of interdependences,
the solitary and self-subsisting individual of modernity—homo clausus—appears
without body or history, as a momentary relay within interdependent and shifting
networks; a vector of energy between past and future; a vacillating perspective
between universalism and particularism; or a shifting figuration of involvement
and detachment (as he argues in his follow-up study on the civilizing process 67).
Galileo’s pendulum already prefigures the revolutions of cosmos and polis implied
by the approach that Mannheim and Elias take with respect to the constitution of
social and natural laws:
In the simple pendulum swing, the Greek cosmos of sacred qualities
collapsed and was replaced by measurable, profane quantities. The
emancipational force of the pendulum came precisely because it was
successful in demonstrating an abstract law of motion, the point at which
the geometrical and experiential coincide into a mathematized
experience.68
As Dušan Bjelić has shown in examining the simultaneously mechanicalmathematical and social-pedagogical aspects of Galileo’s revolutionary device—its
character as an instrument for demonstrating a physical law (of motion and
velocity) within an experimental setting and as a social performance (in the
disciplined trials of the Jesuits, for instance, or in Galileo’s own instructions)—the
pendulum serves as a model for measuring space and time in nature and society
from a standpoint that is not divorced from either physical friction or human
interests.69 Like the famous pendulum that Leon Foucault unveiled in 1851 to a
fascinated public in Paris’s Pantheon Dome,70 Mannheim’s Pendulum
simultaneously projects local and cosmic perspectives for observing rotational
movement from a suspended yet fixed point where one can “watch the world go
round,” so to speak. In contrast to Foucault’s or Galileo’s pendulum, however, the
perspective that Mannheim’s experimental machine affords ultimately directs our
attention inward around the axis of historical time, and along a developmental
path determined by the necessary limits to the agency of things and the essential
contingency of human and nonhuman beings alike. In any case, the oscillating
intelligence objectified in any metaphorical or material instance of the pendulum
suggests that the laws of physics no less than the laws of peoples are not set for all

66. ELIAS, supra note 47, at 472.
67. See 8 ELIAS, supra note 63.
68. BJELIĆ, supra note 33, at 116–17 (emphasis added).
69. Cf. STENGERS, supra note 7, at 129 (arguing that an aspect of “the vocation of the
physicist” is to calculate the degree of friction involved in any given swing of the pendulum).
70. Cf. UNBERTO ECO, FOUCAULT’S PENDULUM 5 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc. 1989) (1988). The merging of these cosmic and local points of view provides the
premise of an elaborate fictional narrative.
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times and all places, but only become observable and verifiable as an
intersubjective and momentary achievement.
IV. THE RETURN OF KYNICAL COSMOPOLITANISM?
[ I]t is impossible for a society to exist without law; for without a city no benefit can be
derived from that which is civilized . . . and there is no advantage in law without the
city . . . . The only true commonwealth was, [Diogenes] said, that which is as wide as
the universe.71
I want to conclude by suggesting that this new figure of thought set adrift—
but never completely cut off from all natural bonds or unattached from all social
ties—should not be dismissed as the contemptuously distrustful and ultimately
capitulatory attitude of the modern cynic. Nevertheless, such was the judgment of
Mannheim by two of his critics and successors, Hannah Arendt and Theodor
Adorno, each of whom charges him with relinquishing the responsibility of the
intellectual in favor of a homeless mode of thinking and existence that passes
endlessly to and fro between ideology and utopia. Where Arendt accuses
Mannheim of falling prey to the paradox of declaring that all thought is situationbound while taking no position himself, Adorno charges him with calling for a
reactionary return to the rootedness of being, rather than making a radical appeal
to change the being in which thought is rooted.72 Adorno—whose Institute for
Social Research shared a building with Mannheim, Elias, and their colleagues in
Frankfurt in the early 1930s—is especially harsh in condemning the sociology of
knowledge for setting up “indoctrination camps for the homeless intelligentsia
where it can learn to forget itself.” 73 He and Arendt depict the liberal
cosmopolitanism of the intellect that Mannheim seems to exemplify as a kind of
freewheeling mobility of thought that cynically ignores or even knowingly
disavows its rootedness in mundane times and material places. Such a perspectival
and pluralist theory of knowledge and culture would therefore seem to find its
counterpart in the actually existing cosmopolitanism of contemporary global
tourism and metropolitan consumerism, where international goodwill,
entrepreneurial travel, and leisurely mobility, along with an expanding set of
omnivorous culinary, artistic, and cultural tastes seem to defy market inequalities
and pass through state borders with ease: “Aided by the frequent-flyer lounges . . .
contemporary cosmopolitans meet others of different backgrounds in spaces that
retain familiarity. . . . Food, tourism, music, literature, and clothes are all easy faces
of cosmopolitanism . . . but they are not hard tests for the relationship between

71. 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 73–75 (R.D. Hicks trans.,
1925).
72.
THEODOR W. ADORNO, The Sociology of Knowledge and Its Consciousness, in PRISMS 35, 37
(Samuel & Shierry Weber trans., 1967); HANNAH ARENDT, Philosophy and Sociology, in ESSAYS IN
UNDERSTANDING, 1930–1954, at 28, 41 (Jerome Kohn ed., 1994).
73. ADORNO, supra note 72, at 49.
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local solidarity and international civil society.”74 Far from resembling today’s
constantly connected, electronically wired intellectuals or perpetually distracted
frequent-flyer cosmopolitans, however, Mannheim and Elias exemplify instead a
restless, curious, and disciplined spirit of open inquiry in search of a cultural and
spiritual home outside of its place of origin, each ultimately finding refuge in the
universities of England. In light of their experiences, I have been arguing that each
was well situated and predisposed to reflect critically upon the responsibilities and
the freedoms of local and global citizenship with its liberal conventions of debate,
modes of deliberation, and institutions of decision making and action.75
If we reflect for a moment on the fact that Mannheim and Elias, as well as
Adorno, Arendt, and others of their generation, did not simply choose to migrate
in the 1930s, but rather, as Jewish intellectuals, were forced from Germany into
exile abroad, then their situation should draw our attention to that aspect of
cosmopolitanism that expresses the dignity of the person, rather than just the duty
of the educated individual or the collective rights of people. Generally speaking,
the global order of the jus cosmopoliticum that emerged in the last century as the
moral and institutional foundation of international law provided the necessary
habitat (milieu) and habitus (disposition) of liberal cosmopolitanism, in both its legal
and intellectual dimensions. To borrow from Michelle McKinley’s eloquent
appeal, such an ethos should strive to move beyond the antinomies of foreignness
versus familiarity and intimacy versus anonymity, which have characterized the
“cosmopolitan” debates of recent years by imagining a more complex and
comprehensive view of global solidarity and local conviviality:
If cosmopolitanism is to have a future beyond a proto-naturalist basis for
spreading goodwill, it needs to ground itself in the kinds of attachments
and connections that engender global solidarity. This integrative move
mirrors the production of “rooted cosmopolitans” in that it recognizes
our special responsibility to those with whom we have significant interpersonal ties but at the same time argues from the point of equity and
cosmopolitan fairness that justice requires global redistributive
measures.76
The burdens of citizenship and the entitlements of law that cosmopolitan thinkers
have embraced in the past century have largely been animated by the spirit of
hospitality that Kant formulated as the most fundamental of cosmopolitan rights:
“[T]he right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on
someone else’s territory.” 77 But where Kant’s rule of global citizenship
(Weltbürgertum) at least implicitly assumed that the territorial bonds of trust,
74. Craig Calhoun, The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually
Existing Cosmopolitanism, 101 S. ATLANTIC Q. 869, 887–89 (2002).
75. David Held, Democracy and the New International Order, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY:
AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 96 (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995).
76. See McKinley, supra note 18, at 85.
77. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS
93, 105 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970).
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allegiance, and loyalty should ultimately provide the foundational frame of
reference for defining the terms of inclusion and membership of the stranger as
well as assistance and security in or outside the nation-state, today the “rights of
others” must often be addressed in terms of the contradictory relations between
local, transnational, and global scales as well.78
In my own terms, the “oscillating intelligence” of the cosmopolitan outlook
is not only manifested in the (apparently) floating figures of the tourist, the
business traveler, and the human rights officer, but also in the bounded situations
of the migrant, the refugee, and the exile. Rather than identify some ideal-typical
or “ultimate cosmopolitan,” however, I want to extend Edward Said’s
representation of the outsider role of the intellectual (and of intelligence more
generally) to include the precarious legal status of the exile as well, insofar as the
position of the exiled intellectual may be well situated for transmitting sacred
culture while questioning forms of patriotic nationalism that promote class, ethnic,
racial, and gender privilege:
The pattern that sets the course for the intellectual as outsider is best
exemplified by the condition of exile, the state of never being fully
adjusted, always feeling outside the chatty, familiar world inhabited by
natives, so to speak, tending to avoid and even dislike the trappings of
accommodation and national well-being. Exile for the intellectual in this
metaphysical sense is restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and
unsettling others.79
In figure 3, I have tried to depict the standpoint of the exile and stranger who
does not just wander aimlessly through the city like the traveler, the pilgrim, or the
trader, but rather “comes today and stays tomorrow” by moving inside, outside,
and along the edges of multiple social circles, as Simmel puts it in the famous
excursus he inserted into his discussion of the spatial forms of sociality.80 If the
back-and-forth movement between home and exile is not to lead to nausea,
disorientation, or a hypnotic state of paralysis, then thought must find its place in
expanding and intersecting spheres of interaction and influence (Wechselwirkungen,
in Simmel’s terms). Likewise, if the “dynamic, elastic, . . . [and] constant state of
flux” 81 that characterizes the cosmopolitan outlook of the modern mind is not to
lead to social dereliction and transgression (which is Said’s concern in criticizing
“free-floating” intellectuals in an implicit reference to Mannheim 82), then the

78. See FRASER, supra note 3, at 12–15, 22; SEYLA BENHABIB, The Philosophical Foundations of
Cosmopolitan Norms, in ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 13, 18–19, 35–36 (Robert Post ed., 2006);
Couze Venn, Altered States: Post-Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism and Transmodern Socialities, 19 THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 65, 70–71 (2002).
79. EDWARD W. SAID, REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL: THE 1993 REITH
LECTURES 52–53 (1994) (emphasis added); cf. 2 SIMMEL, supra note 17, at 370, 376–78.
80. See 2 SIMMEL, supra note 17, at 601–04; cf. Thomas Kemple, The Spatial Sense of Empire:
Encountering Strangers with Simmel, Tocqueville and Martineau, 11 J. CLASSICAL SOC. 340, 340–55 (2011).
81. MANNHEIM, supra note 21, at 156.
82. SAID, supra note 79, at 47.

294

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:273

standpoint it assumes must be relational without being relativist, and perspectival
without striving for a transcendental point of view. The cosmopolitan attitude that
I am defending here—following Mannheim’s critique of Alfred Weber but in the
direction of Elias’s radicalization of Mannheim’s own position—rejects both
fundamentalism and libertarianism, both authoritarianism and anarchism, in favor
of a strategic universalism that acknowledges the vicissitudes of its own situated
particularity.
Figure 3: Kynical Cosmopolitanism

The ethos of legal cosmopolitanism that I am recommending is therefore not
that of today’s “cynics” who appear as resentful critics, self-proclaimed outsiders,
consumers with a clear conscience, or frequent-flyer cosmopolitans, but rather
that of the “kynics” in the sense that this term had in antiquity as applied to
Diogenes. Dubbed the “philosopher in a bathtub” who thinks “like a dog”
(kynikos), Diogenes was welcomed and admired in Athenian social circles despite
being their fiercest critic and having been exiled by the people of his native
Sinope, allegedly for corrupting the currency. Michel Foucault, in his final lectures
at the Collège de France, devoted considerable time reflecting on the life and
sayings of Diogenes in an attempt to recover this ethos of self-transformation
through the courageous encounter with the truth, as exemplified in a life of
scandal, self-improvisation, self-exposure, and confrontations with power that is
the condition for speaking freely (parrhesia).83 Rather than mourning the loss of
this critical ideal, however, Foucault’s concern in examining such an antiquated
instance of transformative speech is arguably to consider how it might be
mobilized and generalized in the present, perhaps even incorporated as an element
of what Marx envisions in his famous figure of “the general intellect”: “The
development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has
become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the
process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect [des

83. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
DE FRANCE, 1983–1984, at 157–305 (Frédéric
2011) (1984).
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allgemeinen Intellekts] and been transformed in accordance with it.” 84 Under
conditions in which professional expertise, technical skill, and social knowledge
become subject to conformist control, perhaps then free speech and critical
thought are possible more as a singular event than as a collective achievement.
Around the same time that Foucault was lecturing on Diogenes, Peter
Sloterdijk was developing a “critique of cynical reason” that, he argues, found its
first, fullest, and most ambivalent expression in the interwar years of the Weimar
era.85 Sloterdijk toys with the idea of calling for a return to the “kynical” principles
of satire, parody, and cheekiness (Frechheit) as they were embodied in the deeds
and words of Diogenes, who condemned the citizens of Sinope to a life of
“home-staying” while declaring himself “citizen of the universe” (kosmopolites):
This grandiose new concept [of the “world citizen”] contains the boldest
answer in antiquity to its most unsettling experience: reason’s becoming
homeless in the social world and the separation of the idea of true living
from the empirical communities. Where socialization for the philosopher
becomes synonymous with the unreasonable demand to be satisfied with
the partial reason of one’s own random culture and to join the collective
irrationality of one’s society, there, the kynic’s refusal has utopian
significance. . . . The kynic thus sacrifices his social identity and forgoes
the psychic comfort of unquestioned membership in a political group in
order to save his existential and cosmic identity. . . . Cosmopolitan sages
as bearers of living reason will accordingly only be able to integrate
themselves unreservedly into a society when it has become a world-polis.
Until then, their role is inevitably that of subversives; they remain the
biting conscience of every dominating self-satisfaction and the affliction
of every local narrowing.86
Diogenes is no free-floating philosopher preaching freedom from all law or
arguing that we embrace the chaos within, but rather a new kind of inhabitant of
the city, neither citizen nor slave, who boldly rejects the closure of parochial
prejudices while tirelessly teaching himself and others “to be prepared for every
fortune.” 87 In the “kynical cosmopolitanism” of the past century, and even in its
liberal and neoliberal expressions today, perhaps we might anticipate the rebellious
return of a utopian figure protected and “placed” by laws that need not be found
everywhere in order to be binding.88 Such a figure may serve to remind us that
conditions for freedom are not just security and equality, but also an unsettling
solidarity and conviviality.

84. KARL MARX, GRUNDRISSE: FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
706 (Martin Nicolaus trans., Penguin Books 1973) (1939).
85. See generally SLOTERDIJK, supra note 51, at 389–539.
86. Id. at 164.
87. 2 LAERTIUS, supra note 71, at 65.
88. See Feldman, supra note 9, at 1066, 1068 (2007); see also BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC
TRANSITION 478–519 (1995).
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